Paying for Delay or Something Else?--The Potential Anticompetitive Effect of Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry under article 101 TFEU by Zhang, Yunzhe
FACULTY OF LAW
Lund University
Yunzhe Zhang
Paying for Delay or Something Else?
The Potential Anticompetitive Effect of Reverse Payment Patent Settlements 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry under article 101 TFEU
JAEM03 Master Thesis
European Business Law
30 higher education credits
Supervisor: Björn Lundqvist
Term: Spring 2014
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 4
1.1 History Background of pay-for-delay................................................................................... 4
1.2 Purpose............................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Methology and Materials.................................................................................................... 8
1.4 Delimitations ...................................................................................................................... 8
2 Arising of Pay-for-delay issue in the EU and the US...................................................... 9
2.1 Background and Regulations of the EU Pharmaceutical Market ......................................... 9
2.1.1 Originators and Generics ...................................................................................................9
2.1.2 Legislation support for generic companies......................................................................10
2.1.3 Legislation support for Originators ..................................................................................10
2.2 US regulations on pharmaceutical market ........................................................................ 11
2.3 Incentives to enter into pay-for-delay deals in settlements .............................................. 12
2.3.1 Incentives for originators .................................................................................................13
2.3.2 Incentives for generics.....................................................................................................13
2.3.3 Uncertainty from the patent system ...............................................................................14
2.4 Pay-for-delay defined by competition authorities............................................................. 14
2.5 Pay-for-delay cases in EU and US ...................................................................................... 17
2.5.1 Pay-for-delay cases and their developments in the EU ...................................................19
2.5.2 Pay-for-delay cases and their developments in the US ...................................................21
2.5.2.1 Per se illegal or scope of patent ............................................................................................. 21
2.5.2.2 Further application of Scope of Patent................................................................................... 22
2.5.2.3 The “quick look” rule-of-reason test ...................................................................................... 23
2.5.2.4 Actavis and rule-of-reason test .............................................................................................. 24
2.5.2.5 Post Actavis ............................................................................................................................ 26
2.5.2.6 Summary of US antitrust scrutinies on pay-for-delay deals ................................................... 28
3 Classifying and analysis of pay-for-delay settlements ................................................ 30
3.1 Necessity of differing and classifying pay-for-delay settlements....................................... 30
3.2 Consideration on classification of pay-for-delay ............................................................... 31
3.3 Introduction of new classification method........................................................................ 32
3.4 Anti-competition risks of variations of pay-for-delay settlements .................................... 33
3.4.1 An extreme case: perfect pay-for-delay...........................................................................33
3.4.2 An Economic presumption on reverse payment – based on the amount of reverse 
payment .......................................................................................................................................34
3.4.3 Red or Orange area: high-risk and medium-risk pay-for-delay deals ..............................35
3.4.3.1 Horizontal Axis........................................................................................................................ 35
3.4.3.2 Application of Vertical Axis ..................................................................................................... 39
3.4.3.3 Conclusion on High-risk and Medium-risk pay-for-delay ....................................................... 40
3.4.4 Yellow area: low-risk pay-for-delay deals ........................................................................41
3.4.4.1 Blacklist: Sham litigation, Fraud in patent obtaining and naked pay-for-delay ...................... 41
3.4.4.2 Burden-of-proof ..................................................................................................................... 44
3.4.5 Other factors influencing assessment of pay-for-delay...................................................45
3.4.5.1 The patent in dispute: substance or follow-on....................................................................... 45
3.4.5.2 Possibility of earlier market entry .......................................................................................... 46
3.5 Proposals .......................................................................................................................... 47
3.6 Summary........................................................................................................................... 49
4 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 50
Bibliography                                                                                                                                          52
Table of Cases                 57
Table of Legislation                  59
1Summary
This thesis discusses the recent hot topic in the intersection of IP law and 
competition law; “pay-for-delay” agreements in the pharmaceutical industry. Such 
agreements arise in patent disputes where originator manufacturers (‘Originators’) claim 
patent infringement by the generic manufactures (‘Generics’). However, patent 
infringing defendants end up paying the plaintiff large sums of money, accompanied 
with the generic’s agreement to delay or refrain from challenging the patent and 
launching generic drugs. Due to the fact that the parties may have agreed to not compete 
by sharing monopoly profits, pay-for-delay deals could lead to an artificially higher
market price which detriments consumer welfare. Whether all suspicious pay-for-delay 
deals are anti-competitive has been controversial in the academic field and the courts in 
the US. As the EU has only recently started its study and investigations into the issue, it 
is worthwhile to study: whether such deals are anti-competitive in themselves, to what 
extent they could be anti-competitive under the EU competition law and how should 
they be examined to reach the optimum result for competition law implementation.
Section 1 of this thesis will firstly give a general picture of the history of pay-
for-delay deals in EU and US. Section 2 will further offer the legal context and the 
industry features that fertilize the emergence of pay-for-delay deals. Section 2.5
summarizes the change of attitude of US courts and the investigations in Europe. 
Through studies into the judgement/decisions of these cases, Section 3 proposes a 
system of classification for pay-for-delay, which puts pay-for-delay deals into high-risk, 
medium-risk and low-risk categories. The rationale and method of such classification 
will also be included. The thesis ends with the conclusion that not all the agreements 
that meet the superficial criteria of pay-for-delay agreements (restriction on generic 
entry and reverse value transfer) are of anti-competitive effect. Some may be the
reasonable result of a genuine patent dispute and will not leave anti-competitive impacts
on the market. It is thus necessary to classify these agreements by their level of anti-
competitive risk and that they should be scrutinized differently in accordance with the 
classification they fall into.
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41 Introduction
1.1 History Background of pay-for-delay
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most innovative sectors in the EU1,
which attracts a high volume of investment2. Businesses of the drug manufacturers and 
investors, health and lives of patients and quality of state welfare are all at stake in this 
industry.
For the pharmaceutical companies, the massive investment and long research 
processes lead to the formation of a heavily patented industry. Companies obtain patents 
to ensure protection of their intellectual work and to recoup previous investment. This is 
especially true for the originator companies, who invest heavily in initial R&D, and the
marketing of new innovative medicines3 . Patents are also essential for the generic 
companies. Generics develop and market drugs that bear the same active ingredient and 
are comparable to an authorized originator’s drug (the ‘reference medicine’) in terms of 
dose and usage. Although such processes are normally much easier than what the 
originators have gone through, investment into R&D is still notable, especially for the 
medium and small size generics. Both originators and generics wish to make the 
previous R&D worthwhile through product profits, which could lead to aggressive 
business strategies with potentially anti-competitive effects.
For states, huge amount of public funds are invested to provide high standard 
healthcare across the EU. Any waste of public funds due to anti-competitive behaviours 
of private firms is surely frowned upon. Thus, behaviours of pharmaceutical companies, 
especially their use of patent should be regulated for the benefits of health welfare.
This conflict of interests has given rise to various new patent strategies adopted 
by the pharmaceutical companies, which often bring new tasks and issues for the 
national authorities.
                                                       
1 Commission, ’ Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report’, COM (2009) 0351 
(Executive Summary)
2 Commission, ‘The 2013 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard’, (Publications Office of the 
European Union 2013), p 11
3 Commission, ’Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry-Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet, Originator-Originator 
competition’, COM (2009) 0351
5The patent strategies used by the originators are mainly aimed to prolong the 
life period of patents and products, or to defer the generics from entering the specific 
market. An example of the first type of strategy could be that originators file new 
patents on an already patented product. Instead of protecting a new drug, such new 
patents often protect delivery profiles, packaging, dosing and other production processes 
of the patented drug4 (so-called ‘evergreen patents’). Some originators also change the 
name of an earlier version of product prior to the expiry of patents. By re-marketing this 
“new” drug to previous consumers and doctors, originators try to secure consumer 
loyalty so that fewer consumers will switch to the future generic drugs. Typical 
strategies to actively delay or exclude entry of generics may involve withdrawing the
first generation of a drug before its patent expiry and meanwhile launching a new 
product with a secondary patent (similar effect as product name-changing). Another 
tactic that originators often use is to file unnecessary patents, sometimes in the 
hundreds, on the same product to confuse the generics that wish to apply for market 
authorization (‘patent clusters’)5 since the generics need to either wait for the legal 
protection on a reference drug to collapse or to innovate around the technologies 
patented.
In the recent decades, a new type of strategy has emerged and caught the 
attention of the competition authorities. In some patent disputes where the originator 
initiated the procedure against certain generics, the originator ended up paying to the 
alleged infringer, resulting in the generics’ delaying or giving up launch of generic 
drugs. This behaviour has been named “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment”. 
Attention from the US competition authority on pay-for-delay deals has existed 
for years. Pay-for-delay has been deemed as an agreement between originators and 
generics to avoid competition by the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)6.
One of the early high-profile reverse payment cases emerged in 1995, where 
two generic manufacturers submitted requests to the FDA for permission to launch 
generic versions of Schering Plough’s K-Dur tablets. The generics claimed the generic 
                                                       
4 Inderjit Singh Bansal, et al, ‘Ever greening- A Controversial Issue in Pharma Milieu’, [2009] 14 Journal 
of Intellectual Property Rights 299
5 Nicoleta Tuominen, 'Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry: Regular Business Practice 
or Abuse of Dominance' [2012] 35(1) World Competition 
<https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=WOCO2012003> accessed 16 
March 2014
6 FTC, ‘ Pay-for-delay: when drug companies agree not to compete’, <http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/mergers-and-competition/pay-delay>, accessed 16 March 2014
6drug would not infringe Schering’s patent due to different chemical composition. 
However, after a settlement agreement, Schering Plough paid the generics respectively 
60 and 30 million USD, leading to one of the generics postponing the marketing for five 
years (but prior to Schering’s patent exclusivity); another generic agreed to license 
Schering the marketing of its generic drug. Initially the administrative court ruled that 
both agreements were legal and the settlements were not illegal per se. But on appeal,
the 11th Circuit held that although the settlement was not per se illegal by including 
ancillary license agreement, it was necessary to adopt a scope of patent test7. It meant as 
long as the restrictions in the settlements was within the scope of Schering Plough’s 
patent, the settlement was not problematic to competition law. This judgement 
reconfirmed the potential anti-competitive effect a pay-for-delay settlement may bring 
about.
After several debated cases, the US Supreme Court finally ruled on the Actavis 
case in 20138 and ruled in favour of the “rule-of-reason” test over FTC’s “per-se illegal”
rule, the detail of which will be expanded below. In Europe, the Commission has started 
its sector inquiry into the pay-for-delay settlements since 2008. Several statements of 
objections on pay-for-delay have been sent since then. Akin to the US Supreme Court’s 
ruling, the EU Commission fined 93 million euro on Danish originator Lundbeck9 and 
52 million euro on other generics involved (“Lundbeck case”). With more pay-for-delay 
investigations appearing in Europe, various predictions have been discussed on how the 
Commission and CJEU will judge this type of deal.
The Commission’s opinion released in Lundbeck and its earlier sector inquiry
report gave rise to discussions between lawyers, economics and corporate 
representatives. In the academic field, some have argued that forbidding pay-for-delay 
in settlements reduces the scope of settlements, making it harder for parties to solve 
disputes. They argue that the parties in a patent dispute have completely reasonable
economic drives to reach pay-for-delay deals due to risk aversion instead of an intention 
to form cartels10. Others try to stress that not all pay-for-delay deals are detrimental to 
                                                       
7 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F. 3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005)
8 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. __ (2013)
9 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Lundbeck and Other Pharma Companies for Delaying 
Market Entry of Generic Medicines’ [2013] IP/13/563 (Lundbeck Press Release)
10 William Choi, Bruce Den Uyl, and Mat Hughes, ‘Pay-For-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector: Lundbeck, Actavis, and Others’ [2014] 5(1) Journal of European Compean Competition Law & 
Practice 44
7competition. Sometimes penetration of generics and their effect of lowering prices could 
be limited or even raised. This could happen when the originator has the confidence in 
its brand and focus on brand-sensitive consumers11. Therefore there might not exist any
anti-competitive effects. Corporations involved in the recent investigations also raised 
some objections to the Commission’s views. The generics from the Lundbeck decision 
have already appealed to the CJEU against the decision and fining12. Representatives of 
Lundbeck also stressed that the Commission has misinterpreted the competitor 
relationship between the parties to the settlement as well as the content of those 
agreements itself13. 
In brief, pay-for-delay in the pharmaceutical sector seems to be a new way of 
abusing patents for competition authorities, yet whether all of them are anti-competitive
and to what extent should they be regulated and prosecuted are complex questions.
1.2 Purpose
By looking into how the pay-for-delay cases have been dealt with in the US and 
the EU, this thesis will attempt to define and differentiate various scenarios of pay-for 
delay deals and analyse their respective potential anti-competitive effects under EU 
competition law. 
The thesis will then suggest an assessment approach based on the characteristics
of these different scenarios. It will demonstrate that different scenarios are of different 
competition law risk and call for different level of investigation. Proposals on how to 
implement such approach and to mitigate potential anti-competitive effects will also be 
elaborated.
                                                       
11 Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision’ 
[2013] Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Forthcoming; University lowa Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 13-35 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286255 >accessed 16 May 2014, p 5
12 Case T-469/13 Generics (UK) v. Commission [2013] ; Case T-460/13 Ranbaxy Laboratories and 
Ranbaxy (UK) v. Commission [2013], T-467/13 Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v. Commission[2013], 
T-470/13 Merck v. Commission [2013], T-471/13 Xellia Pharmaceuticals and Zoetis Products v. 
Commission [2013], T-472/13 Lundbeck v. Commission [2013]
13 Commission, ‘Action Brought on 30 August 2013—H. Lundbeck and Lundbeck v. Commission’ [2013] 
OJ C 325/76
81.3 Methology and Materials
This thesis will mainly adopt the legal dogmatic method, the historical method, 
and the comparative method. 
The legal dogmatic method will be mainly used for analysing the legislation and 
related cases on both sides of the Atlantic; EU treaties, regulations and directives, the 
decisions of the Commission, press release on these decisions, guidelines released by 
Union bodies, and study papers and reports released by the Commission; US 
legislations related to the topic of the case, US case law, and US competition authority’s 
study report on pay-for-delay.The historical method will be used to illustrate the 
development of courts’ changing attitudes on pay-for-delay deals in US from beginning 
of the century till now, the EU Commission’s rising attention and investigations into the 
issue since its pharmaceutical sector inquiry.The comparative legal method will be used 
to compare the legislation frames in pharmaceutical industry between EU and US; to 
contrast the elaborated discussions on pay-for-delay among US courts and academics
with the vague and general remarks from the Commission.  
Certain law and economics views will be presented to illustrate the economic 
motivation of pharmaceutical companies to settle patent disputes with reverse payments. 
These views will show the anti-competitive effects of certain pay-for-delay deals. 
1.4 Delimitations
This thesis will focus on the pay-for-delay behaviour in the EU, with those of 
US as a comparison as only limited amount of cases have been decided in EU.
Even though pay-for-delay could potentially violate both article 101 and article 
102 TFEU, this thesis will mainly focus on the anti-competitive effect under the context 
of article 101. 
Also, the incorporation of US pay-for-delay cases is for the illustration of 
different views on the potential anti-competitive effects of pay-for-delay and potential 
approaches to assess them. This thesis will not conduct in-depth discussion into the
legislations in the US pharmaceutical industry and US antitrust law.
92 Arising of Pay-for-delay issue in the EU 
and the US
2.1 Background and Regulations of the EU 
Pharmaceutical Market 
2.1.1 Originators and Generics
Pay-for-delay deals happen between an originator and one or several generics.
The difference between originators and generics is an important factor that stimulates 
them to reach pay-for-delay deals. The main difference is seen in their R&D investment. 
Originators invest more heavily than most generics. According to the 
Commission’s final report for its Pharma Sector Inquiry (‘Sector Inquiry’), between 
2000-2007, the respondent originators spent around 17% of its global turnover on R&D 
into improving or innovating prescription medicines, which are the main profit 
generators for the originators. On the other hand, generics spend 7% on R&D and focus 
more on manufacturing and marketing14, which normally make generic drugs much 
cheaper than the corresponding originator’s drug. Therefore, regulators around the 
world set up separate market authorization process and protection for the two types of 
companies. Legislations are required to take into consideration both the benefits for 
originators and those for generics to strike the balance between recouping large R&D 
investment and long-term innovation benefits brought about by generic drugs.
                                                       
14 Commission, ‘Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report’ [2009] Staff Working Paper 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf>
accessed 22 March 2014, p 32 
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2.1.2 Legislation support for generic companies
In the EU, one of the main protections for the generics is the so-called Bolar 
provision in the Data Exclusive Directive15. In order to fulfil a market authorization, 
most generics would need to conduct certain tests and clinical trials in relation to the 
patented originator’s drug. Such tests and trials prior to the expiry of an originator’s 
patent were previously not regulated at EU level. Most Member States deemed such 
tests as potential infringements of the originator’s patent. The Bolar provision enables 
the generics to conduct tests and trials that are strictly necessary to obtain market 
authorization before the expiry of patent without risk of infringing the patent.
Besides the Bolar provision, generics are also offered a more expedite procedure 
of market authorization application. According to the amended article 10 of Data 
Exclusive Directive, the generics are refrained from providing results of pre-clinical 
tests and trials if they can demonstrate similarity of the generic drug to an already 
market authorized originator’s drug. The authorities will rely on the data of tests and 
trials already submitted by the originator. The abridged application and Bolar provision 
simplify the market authorization process for generics, no matter what route of 
procedure they choose. Both the research activity and filing of abridged application are 
only allowed after period of data exclusivity, the concept of which will be explained 
below.
2.1.3 Legislation support for Originators
Originators enjoy a period of data exclusivity in relation to abridged 
applications from the generics. The convenience provided for the generics is not 
unlimited. According to the amended Data Exclusive Directive, for eight years after an 
originator’s obtaining of market authorization, generic applicants may not refer to the 
information and data relating to pre-clinical testing of the original drug. Also generics 
may not bring to market generic drugs by filing an abridged application until an 
originator’s has obtained market authorisation for 10 years. This provides the 
                                                       
15 Council Directive (EC) 01/83 of November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use [2001] OJ L 311/67 art. 10(6)
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originators with a less disturbed period to explore its profits and to recover the massive 
R&D investments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
And to make up for the period that market authorization applicants spend on 
tests and trials, the EU has created a Supplemental Protection Certificate (hereinafter 
“SPC”) 16 scheme. The idea is that for medicines, patent protection of 20 years is 
strongly lessened by its long and complex market authorization process. Holders should 
at least enjoy an effective period of protection for 15 years, meaning the years of patent 
protection deducted by years applying for market authorization should at least be 15 
years. If the effective period is less than 15 years, an SPC will be granted, allowing an 
extra period of patent protection with a maximum of five years.
2.2 US regulations on pharmaceutical market
In the US, the process of market authorization for drugs is overseen by the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and regulated by the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). The main legislation balancing the benefits between 
originators and generics is the Hatch-Waxman Act (‘WHA’). 
Similar to the situation in the EU, the FDA offers data exclusivity protection 
for the originators, the protection of which is between 5 to 7 years17. During this period, 
the generics may not rely on data of an originator’s drug for its own generic drugs.
For the generic manufacturers, they may apply for an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (“ANDA”), equivalent to the EU abridged application. The generic may 
either wait for the patent on the originator’s drug to elapse or actively challenge the 
validity of the patent. If such a challenge succeeds, the WHA grants the first generic 
challenger a 180-day marketing exclusive period, where other generics are not allowed 
to compete with the first mover. As the generics’ profits depend largely on peer 
competition, the 180 days are highly valuable for the generics. Prices of a generic drug 
                                                       
16 Council Regulation (EC) 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary 
protection certificate for medicinal products [1992] OJ L182
17 FDA, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on patents and exclusivity’, 
<http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#How long is exclusivity 
granted for?>, accessed on 29 March 2014
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are said to drop substantially once another authorized generic enters the market 18. It 
also means substantial monopoly and profit loss from the originators to the generics. In 
the EU case Lundbeck, the price of the originator’s drug Citalopram is said to have 
dropped on average by 90% in the UK with the entry of a corresponding generic drug19. 
This arrangement is aimed at encouraging the generics to file ANDA and 
challenge patents of originators’ drugs, leading to a more dynamic competition between 
the generics and originators. The originator can counter this process by alleging patent
infringement from the generics that refer to its drug. If this is the case, the FDA is 
obliged to suspend the process of approving the generic’s ANDA for 30 months. During
this period the parties may litigate or settle prior to a court judgment20.
2.3 Incentives to enter into pay-for-delay deals in 
settlements
The various legislation arrangements explained in Section 2.1 aim at balancing 
the benefits of both the generics and the originators and facilitating their business, but
competition law does bear other social functions. Such functions could be: ensuring
freedom of actions of individuals, innovation in a society, structure of a market, or 
consumer welfare21. In terms of pay-for-delay deals, the ultimate intention of legislators 
is to maintain a large amount of innovative drugs as well as reasonable drug price. 
While for the companies, it is always profits that are more inducing. As with many other 
patent strategies, pay-for-delay settlements originated in the context of conflicts of 
interests between the public and private sector. Drug companies maximize their own 
profits through settlement agreements in order to avoid the intervening of competition 
law.
                                                       
18 FTC, ‘Authorized Generics: An interim Report, Federal Trade Commission Report’ [2009] 
<http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generics-interim-report-federal-
trade-commission/p062105authorizedgenericsreport.pdf>, accessed on 02 April 2014
19 Alexander Italianer, ‘Competitor agreements under EU competition law’ (40th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, September 2013)
20 United States Congress, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, p.L. 98-417
21 Vladimir Bastidas Venegas, ‘A legal and Economic Analysis of the Application of Article 101 TFEU to 
Patent Technology Transfer Agreements’ (PhD thesis, Stockholm University 2011)
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2.3.1 Incentives for originators   
Because the entry of generic drugs normally would substantially affect the 
originator’s profit, most originators may not want to run the risk of losing the market 
monopoly and the profit because of court decisions. Nor do the big originators wish to 
see lost of reputations due to patent litigations. 
Even though many competition law practitioners argue that the risk aversion 
attitude of originators is a sign for weak patent, many originators counter-argue that 
patent disputes are highly complicated and unpredictable in the European Union. It is 
rather common that patent right holders are not perfectly confident in this situation22. 
Originators’ risk-aversion attitude is thus exacerbated by such uncertainty and the 
importance of the patents, in spite of their confidence in the disputed patent.
2.3.2 Incentives for generics
For generics, limited market profit and financial constraints are major factors 
for participating in pay-for-delay deals. Market prices of an originator’s drug are said to 
be 25% lower once generics enter the market23. Therefore, the profit that generics are 
able to generate during their own monopoly period might be limited due to relatively 
low price of generic drugs. Prices of generic drugs would drop further after other 
generics are allowed on the market. At this point, the prices of generic drugs are on 
average 40% lower than the previous originator’s monopoly price24. The estimated profit 
for the generics may thus be lower than originators’ profit loss due to the lowered price, 
the scale of the generic firm and its marketing capacity. The originators will have 
enough profit to share to a competing generic, which also prefers to avoid the hassle of 
market competition. A lump sum payment or periodical payments may become an ideal 
settlement solution for small generics with limited cash flow25 . Side deals such as 
licensing and marketing agreements with the originator could be a more sustainable and 
                                                       
22 Pat Treacy and Sophie Lawrance, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Out of Courts Settlements’ in 
Steven D. Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi, Intellectual Property and Competition Law : New Frontiers
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
23 Executive Summary (n 1) p 9. 
24 Executive Summary (n 1) p 10.
25 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Johnson & Johnson and Novartis 16 million for delaying 
market entry of generic pain-killer fentanyl’, IP 13/1233 [2013] (J&J Press Release)
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secure way of gaining profits. This is especially true for those firms sharing other 
similar or related products.
The worries of losing patent disputes impose more influence on the smaller
generics. Preparation of patent disputes is often costly, yet the litigation time limit is 
sometimes not enough for the generics to present all its proofs. It is reported in the 
Executive Summary of Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry26 that it takes more than two 
years to obtain about 80% of final decisions from the EPO regarding patent disputes, 
making it hard for generics to elaborate details of patents to secure a favourable 
decision. This intensifies the risk aversion attitude of the generic firms. Building up a 
business relationship is of often preferred to the risk of losing the patent litigation27.
2.3.3 Uncertainty from the patent system
Another factor affecting originators and generics is the uncertainty of patent 
dispute resolution offered by the patent offices across the Europe.
According to the Commission’s sector inquiry, due to lack of a union patent, the 
same patent dispute in different Member states may sometimes receive conflicting 
results28. It is clear that drug manufacturers who have heavily invested into their patents 
do not want to risk profits in a messy patent system. As some have said, the more 
inefficiencies a patent system brings, the greater the risk of expansive competition law 
intervention due to large amount of private agreements29.
2.4 Pay-for-delay defined by competition authorities
What is a pay-for-delay settlement? This section will first introduce the notion
of pay-for-delay settlements in the competition authorities’ eyes. 
The notion of pay-for-delay agreements in the EU came from the said Sector 
Inquiry in 2009, during which the Commission noticed delays in the entry of generic 
medicines and decline in innovation30. However, there is no official definition of what is 
                                                       
26 Executive Summary (n 1) p 12.
27 J&J Press Release (n 22) p 278
28 Pharmaceutical Inquiry Final Report (n 14)
29 Nicoleta Tuominen (n 5)
30 Executive Summary (n 1), p3.
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an anti-competitive pay-for-delay agreement, as the legal concerns on pay-for-delay 
agreements have not been elaborated extensively, nor has the Commission published 
any decision. Yet according to the Commission, there are two key elements that make a 
settlement agreement between generics and originators suspicious to competition 
authorities. The First element is the limitation imposed on the generic company’s ability 
to launch its own drugs and second is an agreed value transfer from the originator to the 
generic company31. Only those agreements that limit the market entry of generics are 
likely to attract competition law scrutiny (defined as ‘B type agreements’ according to 
the Commission Sector Inquiry). And those B type agreements that bear value transfers
(‘B.II. agreements’) are more likely to be scrutinized by the Commission than those 
without value transfers (‘B.I. agreements’). Yet the Commission has acknowledged that 
not all B.II. agreements are anti-competitive by nature, each case should be reviewed 
individually32. This is because value transfers in the agreements have different bases, 
some of which may be justifiable.
In the US, the FTC has described the pay-for-delay agreements in a similar 
fashion. Agreements restricting generic entry with compensation from the brand (US 
notion of originators, “originators” hereafter) to the generic are deemed problematic33.
Knowing the two key elements help us to understand that various types of pay-
for-delay agreements exist. In practice, limitation to generic entry may take different 
forms, giving the originator different level of control and resulting in different degrees 
of delay. The most straightforward form of limitation would be that the generics agree 
not to launch their own drug. Such limitation could be imposed until the expiry of the 
disputed patent, after the expiry of the patent, or even until further notice from the 
originator. The originator could also require the generic to refrain from challenging the 
patent in dispute forever (“non-challenge clause”). License agreements from the 
originator to the generic with limitations on: quantities, composition, pricing or other 
marketing conditions are also deemed as limitations since they control the freedom of 
the generic to launch its own products whenever it becomes possible. Other agreements, 
                                                       
31 Commission, ‘4th report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 2012)’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report4_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 Apr 2014, p3. (4th Monitoring Report)
32 Executive Summary (n 1), p 5.
33 FTC, ‘Pay-for-delay: How drug Company Pay-offs Cost Consumer Billions’ (2010) <
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-
consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf > p2., accessed 17 
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such as distribution agreements that involve exclusive sourcing from the originator are 
also deemed as limitations to generic entry34. 
As to value transfer, the most straightforward form is monetary payment from 
the originator to the generic. Such value transfers could either be consideration for the 
generic’s undertaking of delaying the launch of its product or for the originator’s
purchase of the generic’s stock (disable the possibility of further preparation of 
launching of generic drugs). Another kind of value transfer is what the Commission 
called side deals, which are agreements offering the generic some commercial benefits. 
Some side deals grant the generics limited market entry (either in another market other 
than the disputed one, or with another product of the originator), others grant the generic 
some license agreements to enable market entry within the originator’s control. Overall, 
the side deals trade some profit benefits of the originator for limitations on the generic’s 
freedom to launch its own product, which is more valuable to the originator than the 
side deal.
In conclusion, there seems no official definition on what conditions ensure an 
anti-competitive pay-for-delay deal. Instead, both competition authorities in the EU and 
in the US propose criteria to spot potentially anti-competitive pay-for-delay deals; those 
with reverse payment and restriction on generic entry. 
Out of these suspicious agreements, one type is considered especially harmful35. 
When the parties end a settlement, not because of the merit of the originator’s patent, 
but because of the inducement from the originator, they reached an agreement not to 
compete by sharing the monopoly profit. Consumers lose the chance to benefit from a 
lowered drug price. Such arrangement between firms is of a cartel nature.
Article 101(1) forbids competing firms to engage in cartels such as market 
sharing and controlling. Such arrangements are normally regarded as anti-competitive 
by object because firms divide up markets mainly to protect themselves from 
competition pressure, costing the consumers more for less competitive products36. In the 
past cases, typical ways to avoid market competition and market division include price-
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fixing37, market sharing38, bid rigging39, etc. The Commission and the Court have 
consistently fined such behaviors heavily. Although undertakings may escape article 
101 according to article 103 TFEU, true cartels like these have little chance of being 
exempted. Even for the technology transfer agreements, which are generally regarded as 
pro-competitive, the limitation of output and allocation of markets are not exempted by 
Block Exemption40. 
Should a suspicious pay-for-delay settlement bear similar effects to market 
division and avoiding competition, despite its novel appearance, it should be seen as a 
cartel in nature. However, in practice, the competition authorities need to answer: how 
can one differentiate this type of cartel pay-for-delay from others; and whether other 
types of pay-for-delay deals may bring anti-competitive effect.
2.5 Pay-for-delay cases in EU and US
              This section will review the landmark cases in the EU and the US in order to 
demonstrate the common structure of a pay-for-delay deal in recent cases. From 
studying the change of view of the competition authorities, this section aims to analyse 
what makes a pay-for-delay deal anti-competitive from the current competition 
authorities’ view and how the competition authorities and courts have tried to 
investigate such deals. Such analysis will facilitate the understanding of features of 
different pay-for-delay deals and how we should treat the different types of deal.
Table A. Summary of recent pay-for-delay cases in EU and US
Case Name Restriction on the generic’s market Form of value transfer
Lundbeck 41
(EU)
 Delay market entry for the duration 
of the agreement, no guaranteed 
entry time.
 Main substance patent has already 
 Monetary: Significant lump sum; 
Direct payment for buying 
stocks.
 Distribution agreement with 
                                                       
37 Calcium Carbide (Case COMP/39.396) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C301/18
38 Power Transformers (Case COMP/39.129) Commission Decision [2009] OJ C 301/18; Prestressing 
Steel (Case COMP/38.344) Commission Decision [2010] OJ C 339/7
39 Marine hoses (COMP/39.406) Commission Decision [2009]
40 Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to technology transfer agreements [2014]  C 89/3 (Block Exemption Guideline)
41 Case T-469/13 Generics (UK) Ltd v. European Commission [2013] OJ C325; Lundbeck (Case 
COMP/39226) Commission Decision [2013] no public version available yet
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expired.
 Process patent in dispute.
guaranteed profits.
J&J with 
Novartis 42
(EU)
 Delay market entry until a third party 
launches generic drug
 Main substance patent has already 
expired.
 No patent dispute.
 Monetary: monthly payments 
(exceeding the generic’s expected 
profits accordingly).
 “co-promotion agreement”.
Actavis43 (US)  Delay market entry until 65 months 
prior to patent expiry unless third 
party launches generic drug.
 FDA has already approved Actavis’ 
generic drug.
 Main substance patent expired.
 Disputed main patent itself was a 
formulation patent44.
 Monetary: yearly payment.
 Agreement enabling the generic 
to promote the originator’s drug 
to doctors.
Cipro45 (US)  Delay market entry until the patent 
expires.
 Acknowledge patent infringement.
 Disputed main patent itself was a 
structural change to increase 
chemical potency.
 Monetary: lump sum payment.
Schering-
Plough Corp46
(US)
 Delay market entry for five years but 
before patent expiry.
 Disputed main patent itself was a 
formulation patent on unpatented 
substance47.
 Monetary: payment as upfront 
loyalties and milestone 
payments.
 License agreement enabling the 
originator to market some of the 
generic’s products.
Table A is a summary of the high-profile pay-for-delay cases appeared in EU and US,
representing the previous and current views on such deals from the competition 
authorities.
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45 Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y 2005)
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2.5.1 Pay-for-delay cases and their developments in the EU
The two recently decided cases in Europe are the Lundbeck case and the J&J 
case. Lundbeck was the inventor and manufacturer of a blockbuster antidepressant 
medicine Citalopram, the main substance patent of which has expired. The generic firms 
thus have fewer worries on infringing Lundbeck’s main substance patent rights. 
However in 2002, Lundbeck agreed with each of these generic companies to delay the 
market entry of cheaper generic versions of Citalopram for the duration of the 
agreements without giving the generic producers any guarantee of market entry. In 
return, Lundbeck paid the generic firms with significant lump sums and bought out 
stocks of the generics involved. Lundbeck also offered the generic firms with distributor 
agreements with guaranteed profits. In 2013, the Commission imposed a fine of 93.8 
million euros on Lundbeck and 52.2 million on the various generic firms involved. 
Although the public version of the Commission decision has not yet been published we 
can tell from the press release that the Commission holds that the parties have violated 
article 101 TFEU by agreeing not to compete, benefiting each other at the sacrifice of 
social health welfare and consumers48. 
Following Lundbeck, originator Johnson and Johnson was fined 10.7 million 
euros and Novartis as the generic involved was fined 5.9 million euros. In 2005, J&J’s 
patent protection on the fentanyl depot patch expired in the Netherlands and generic 
firm Sandoz started preparing for launch of a generic version of the drug. Yet later the 
parties concluded an agreement to delay the market entry of the generic drug. In return 
Sandoz received monthly payments, which were said to be higher than its expected 
profits from its sales of the generic drug. The parties also signed a “co-operation 
agreement” where Novartis undertook to co-promote J&J’s other products. According to 
the Commission’s press release, no date of allowed market entry was noted. The 
agreement was terminated in 2006 when another generic firm brought their product to 
the market. The Commission concluded that the agreement(s) was anti-competitive and 
infringed article 101 TFEU because the parties, instead of competing, cooperated to 
avoid launching a generic of Fentayl, sharing the monopoly profits and bringing harm to 
consumers. The Commission pointed out that such intention of conspiracy was obvious 
                                                       
48 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Lundbeck and Others for 
Preventing Market Entry of Generic Antidepressant Medicine’ [2012] IP/12/834
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from the fact that J&J’s subsidiary didn’t consider other competitors but Sandoz for the 
“co-promotion agreement” and that Sandoz had only engaged in very limited co-
promotion activities49. The Commission views the co-promotion more like a sham to 
cover the reverse payment and share of profits rather than a genuine agreement.
A third pay-for-delay case in EU is the Servier case 50 (currently pending). 
According to the press release on opening of formal proceedings, the French originator 
firm Servier invited generics to conclude settlement agreements, which could be aimed 
at delaying or preventing the market entry of generic versions of Perindopril. The action 
was a kind of  “restrictive business practice” in violation of article 101 TFEU. As 
Servier is also a dominant firm in the relevant market, its purchase of key technologies 
of producing perindopril could be abuse of dominance and thus in violation of article 
102 TFEU.
So far the cases objected by the Commission are not all straightforward cartel
cases. In terms of restrictions on generic entry, both Lundbeck and J&J case imposed 
delay of generic product launching after expiry of the originator’s main substance patent
on the drug. In terms of value transfer, both cases included direct monetary payment 
together with other kinds of commercial agreements (“side agreements”). The payments 
were mostly considerations of these other kinds of agreements. According to the 
Commission’s press releases, such deals are restrictive business activities in nature due 
to several conclusions:
1) The payments were aimed to bribe the generics, inducing the generic to 
refrain from competing on the market at the sacrifice of higher market price.
2) The side agreements were shams designed to cover the intention of the 
monetary payment. The amount of payments was excessive compared to the 
terms of side agreements. 
3) The huge reverse payments show the originator’s weak confidence in the 
disputed patent. The Commission thus had reasonable doubt on the validity 
of the disputed patents.
However, parties of both cases planned future appeals and claimed that the 
Commission misinterpreted the agreements. The key controversy is on the interpretation 
of the purpose of value transfer and the validity of the disputed patents. Lundbeck has 
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declared in its own press release51 in response to the Commission’s fine that the validity 
of its process patents on Citalopram was solid and never an issue. It claimed that the 
generics had acknowledged infringement on these patents in their internal documents. 
The reverse payment was legitimate consideration for the side agreement, which is just 
an additional outcome of a give-and-take settlement agreement. It is reasonable that
firms with similar products are more likely to reach settlements and trade goods instead 
of go into litigations to make one party lose.
While details of facts have not been offered for in-depth discussion, two 
questions are prominent. The first is; whether the kind of deal explained by the drug 
manufacturers is acceptable under EU competition law. If yes, where is the line between 
an acceptable settlement and an anti-competitive pay-for-delay. The second is, how can 
we differentiate them from a competition authority’s point of view?
2.5.2 Pay-for-delay cases and their developments in the US
              In the US the debate on pay-for-delay cases starts from FTC’s strong stance on 
the per-se illegal view in many cases. After some disagreements between the district 
courts, the US Supreme court finally made a ruling in the recent case FTC v. Actavis52, 
which established that the proper approach towards pay-for-delay deals should be rule-
of-reason.
2.5.2.1 Per se illegal or scope of patent
One of the early US cases on pay-for-delay was Schering-Plough Corp . v. FTC
(Schering-Plough).53 Schering, the originator company, paid generic companies Upsher 
with 60 million USD and EDI with 30 million USD. Upsher agreed to postpone their 
entry of a generic drug five years later but before patent entry. Meanwhile Schering was 
licensed to market various Upsher’s products as a value transfer. 
Initially the administrative judge held that both agreements are legal and reverse 
payment did not make the settlement anticompetitive per se. Later on appeal, the 11th 
Circuit amended the administrative judge’s view, holding that reverse payment, as a part 
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of the ancillary license agreement, did not make the settlement per se illegal. However, 
the court required the examination of the scope of the exclusionary zone of the patent; 
the extent to which the agreements exceed the scope and whether it results in actual 
competitive results. This ruling was named as “scope of patent” approach. The 
foundation is that patent itself is a monopoly power. Law permits such monopoly, so 
that researchers can gain financial reward to their work. But law also limit patents in a 
“zone of exclusion”, so that after inventors have recouped their R&D investments, the 
knowledge can be shared for future development in the public domain. The Circuit court 
thus concluded that use of patent rights within that zone of exclusion is not an antitrust 
issue. 
2.5.2.2 Further application of Scope of Patent
The Schering-Plough case was later followed by the Cipro case54. In Cipro, 
Bayer held a patent on the anti-biotic drug Cipro. In 1991, Barr applied for generic 
versions referring to Bayer’s patent on Cipro. Bayer sued Barr but settled with 49 
million of reverse payment. Barr undertook not to market the generic until the patent 
expired, and acknowledged that Barr had infringed a valid patent. The Federal Circuit
court followed Schering case, holding that to establish the settlement agreement is 
illegal, and that the FTC should adopt the scope of patent test. Without additional 
anticompetitive restraints, reverse payment settlements of a genuine patent dispute are 
“within the exclusionary zone of the patent”. And as patents shall be presumed valid 
until proven otherwise, this issue cannot be “redressed by federal antitrust law”55.The 
Federal court also responded to the possibility that the patent dispute itself was a sham 
litigation. Even though the court recognized this as a potential issue, it stressed that the 
plaintiff mush show the lawsuit to be “objectively baseless”, meaning no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits, and that the litigant’s 
“subjective motivation” for bringing the action was a sham to conceal antitrust 
behaviours56.
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This decision of the Federal court was consistent with views of the 2nd and 11th
Circuits in various cases 57 . Yet the 6th Circuit court ruled on one pay-for-delay 
Cardizem58 by using per-se illegal approach. The Federal Court responded in Cipro that
the 6th Circuit reached this conclusion due to specific facts in Cardizem. In Cardizem, 
the restriction on the generic firm was clearly out of the scope of patent rights because 
there was not an issue of patent infringement from the generic firm. The generic firm
promised not to market a non-infringing drug in that case. Till that point, the scope of 
patent test seemed to be widely applied by US courts.
2.5.2.3 The “quick look” rule-of-reason test
,Not all Circuit courts endorsed the scope of patent test. In a later private 
antitrust lawsuit in relation to Schering-Plough’s pay-for-delay deal59, the 3rd Circuit 
court rejected the scope of patent test and applied a “quick look” rule of reason test.
The judge of the 3rd Circuit court noted that on history, the scope of patent test 
has never subjected a pay-for-delay case under antitrust law. Yet pay-for-delay 
agreements do have the potential effect of stifling competition. The court also 
challenged the previous presumption of the validity of patents in patent scope tests,
stating that patent is not a substantive right of the patentee, but rather a procedural 
device. Thus the court applied a “quick look” rule of reason, which it deemed more 
appropriate. The test would subject patent settlements with reverse payment under 
antitrust law yet meanwhile comply with the public policy favouring settlements. The 
3rd Circuit Court instructed that reverse payment in patent settlements should be deemed 
as a prima facie unreasonable restraint of trade, unless it could be proven that the 
reverse payment was for a purpose other than delaying market entry of generic drugs, or 
that the agreements offer pro-competitive benefits. 
The decision of the 3rd Circuit court highlighted the potential anti-competitive 
effect of pay-for-delay deals and the flaw of scope of patent approaches in examining 
such potential. The split between circuit courts lead to anticipation on the US Supreme 
Court to review the pay-for-delay issue.
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2.5.2.4 Actavis and rule-of-reason test
In 2013, finally the FTC v. Actavis case60 was appealed to the Supreme Court.
Originator Solvay Pharmaceuticals holds the patent for its drug Androgel. Two generic 
firms Actavis and Paddock applied ANDA for the marketing of generic equivalents of 
AndroGel. Solvay then sued Actavis for patent infringement according to the Hatch-
Waxman Act. The dispute lasted for three years. As the FDA is entitled to grant market 
permission after 30 months of patent settlement, Actavis obtained the market permission 
from the FDA during its patent dispute with Solvay. However, instead of launching the 
generic product with the market permit, Solvay and Actavis reached a settlement 
agreement where Actavis and other generics were restricted not to bring their generic 
drugs on the market until 65 months prior to the patent expiry, unless a third party 
launched the generic drug earlier. In return, the value transfer from Solvay included 
direct monetary payments and a license agreement enabling the generics to market and 
promote AndroGel to doctors.
The FTC then filed suit against all the parties involved, claiming that the parties
violated antitrust law by refraining from competing and sharing monopoly profits. The
11th Circuit Court applied the scope of patent test and concluded that in absence of sham 
litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, the restrictions imposed did not go beyond the 
scope of patents.
As with lots of other circuit courts, the 11th Circuit Court stressed the public 
policy support for settlements in general and noted that the parties should not be forced 
to finalize a patent litigation for the purpose of antitrust procedure. However the 
Supreme Court neither endorsed the 11th Circuits scope of patent test, nor FTC’s per-se 
illegal rule, nor the quick look rule of reason test. The Court developed its own rule-of-
reason test by a narrow margin between the majority and the dissenters.
Firstly, Supreme Court’s opinions on Actavis reaffirmed that patent settlements 
should be weighted against antitrust law as well as patent law. Because the patents in 
dispute were ended by a settlement, it is unreasonable to answer the antitrust question 
by presuming the validity of the patent.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out the potential “genuine adverse 
effects on competition” that the restraints in pay-for-delay cases might cause, namely 
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when a drug company pays off its competitor to be out of the market and divide the 
monopoly profit it might otherwise lose during the patent litigation61. While some of 
these restrictions in a settlement agreement might be justified, some are not. In cases 
where the restrictions are unjustified and brings anticompetitive harm, the size of the 
reverse payment is a strong indication of the patentee’s power to realise these harms.  
Thirdly, the Supreme Court stressed that the public policy in favour of 
settlements cannot immunise patent settlements from antitrust scrutiny. It is possible and 
common in patent settlements that reverse payment happens, for instance for the 
litigation expenses saved by the settlement or fair consideration for services provided by 
the originator. Those cases, according to the Supreme Court, may not intend to or have 
the consequence of antitrust effect62. But large amounts of reverse payment are still 
indicative of antitrust behaviour. The amount of the reverse payment shows the 
originator’s financial power to charge high prices after the generic leaves the market, 
harming consumer welfare.
The court also suggested that the parties could settle in other ways to avoid 
sacrificing consumer welfare. If the originator offers generics entry into the market 
earlier than patent expiration, the generics are compensated with market profits, 
meanwhile competition and lower price is brought about.
Finally, the court explained its refusal to apply the quick look approach. The 
quick look approach should only be favored over the rule of reason when the 
arrangement in question is blatantly anticompetitive for people with limited economic 
knowledge. The court concluded this was not the case at hand. The likelihood of a 
reverse payment of anti-competitive effect is a complex issue, where the size of reverse 
payment should be compared to the anticipated future litigation costs, its independence 
from the other services provided by the generics and other possible justifications.
Without giving out detailed instructions on structure of a rule-of-reason test, the 
court leaves it for the future trial courts to carry out a fair and efficient assessment. Such
uncertainty created by Actavis would possibly make it harder for the originators and the 
generics to settle disputes in the future63.
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2.5.2.5 Post Actavis
The years after the Actavis case still saw a rising amount of pay-for-delay 
deals64. Till now, the drug manufacturers are still carrying on reaching pay-for-delay 
deals. Boehringer Ingelheim, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”), Teva and lots of other top 
drug companies are involved in pending or recent pay-for-delay deals65.
In January 2014, the district court of New Jersey dismissed a pay-for-delay 
case66, which was later remanded by the 3rd Circuit court in light of Supreme court’s 
opinion on Actavis. The district court nevertheless affirmed its dismissal, the reasoning 
of which is inspiring for the pay-for-delay debate. 
Originator GSK and the generic Teva were sued by a third party for agreeing to 
delay marketing of generic drug of Lamictal (“Lamictal”). In return, GSK undertook not 
to launch an authorized generic version of Lamictal after Teva’s entry to market. (“No-
AG agreement”) This means Teva will face less competition and therefore gain higher 
future profits. The plaintiff and the FTC deemed this as a reverse payment. However, 
the trial court pointed out that Actavis should only apply to patent settlement agreements 
that involve monetary reverse payment without justifiable reasons67 . The Supreme 
Court especially noted that parties could settle in other ways than reverse payment, such 
as allowing earlier market entry for the generics. It should be respected that every 
settlement agreement would contain considerations and benefits to both sides, which is 
a fact that Actavis didn’t change. Noting that no monetary sum was paid in Lamictal, 
and that the settlement agreements are all directly related to the Lamictal patents, the 
district court accepted the originator’s No-AG agreement as a normal settlement 
condition.
In addition, the trial court judge also stressed that from Actavis it is clear that 
not all monetary reverse payments will lead to antitrust scrutiny since the Supreme 
Court rejected the per-se illegal approach and the quick look rule-of-reason. Instead, the 
“potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”, depends on “the size of the 
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payment, its scale in relation to the payer’s anticipated future litigation costs, its 
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of 
any other convincing justification”68. After these considerations, it is up for the court to 
observe whether the parties to the agreements had market power and exercised it, 
whether the agreements brought anti-competitive consequences and whether reasonable 
justification exists to show the settlement was not intended to maintain supra-
competitive prices or serve as a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness.
For the purpose of discussion, the court carried out the rule-of-reason test on to 
Lamictal  in spite of its decision to dismiss the case. The court thus found that the No-
AG agreement is not likely to bring anti-competitive effect due to its lack of large 
monetary payment and short period (six months in Lamictal). The court also found the 
payment could be justified. GSK, according to the court, saved litigation cost, took 
away the uncertainty of a patent dispute and gained benefits from Teva’s licensed sales 
of its drug. The value of the No-AG agreement reflects the value of the aforementioned 
consideration fairly.
Its not surprising that Judge Walls’ opinion remains controversial; it is criticized 
for being too formalistic on illustration of ’payment’ and thus overlooks the economic 
effects. And some think that Judge Walls should not look for the intention of parties to 
retain supra-competitive prices but rather examine the effect that the No-AG agreement 
will bring about69.
Despite all the criticism, it was clear from Walls’ judgment that the court 
attempts to strike the balance between respecting the scope of settlements and prevent 
anti-competition harms. Also, the discussion on the scope of implementation of Actavis  
itself shows that the court doesn’t regard all agreements containing delay of entry and 
value transfer anti-competitive per-se. The court carried out its own analysis to 
differentiate the Lamictal from Actavis.
The Lamictal judgment also mentioned two other decisions released post 
Actavis, re Liptor70 and re Nexium71. Both decisions of the cases supported a wider 
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interpretation of ‘payment’, claiming nothing in Actavis indicates the payment is 
confined to money. It could be expected that debates on implementations of Actavis in 
terms of ‘payment’ will carry on. This thesis will cover this main issue of Lamictal in 
the analysis of pay-for-delay deals.
2.5.2.6 Summary of US antitrust scrutinies on pay-for-delay deals
The antitrust scrutiny against pay-for-delay deals in US reflects the changing 
views on pay-for-delay deals’ anti-competitive effect. 
The FTC and district courts were originally on two ends of the debate. The FTC 
strongly accused pay-for-delay as being per-se anti-competitive. Yet the district courts 
mostly held that pay-for-delay was an issue arising from patent disputes. Since patents 
are legal monopoly rights, they are exempted from antitrust law, as long as the patent 
settlements are within the scope of patent granted by patent law.
From the 3rd Circuit’s “quick look” rule of reason, where pay-for-delay 
agreements are presumed anti-competitive unless proven otherwise, some US courts 
started to recognize that even when a settlement seems within the scope of patent, they 
may have anti-competitive effects. Indeed, the patent offices may manage the patents 
prior and during patent issuance, but once a patent issues, it should be deemed the same 
as any other business property, which could be subject to harmful use72. 
The split between the circuits finally lead to the Supreme Court’s judgment on 
Actavis, which rejected all the approaches previously used by the lower courts. As the 
author understands, Actavis established several crucial rules in dealing with pay-for-
delay deals. Firstly, Actavis showed that not all settlement agreements involving 
limitations on generic entry and reverse payment are anti-competitive. It is the behavior
of sharing monopoly profits to avoid losing monopoly power that is most anti-
competitive. Secondly, some reverse payment may have fair reasons to exist as a natural 
outcome of a genuine patent settlement, for instance litigation cost or fair consideration 
for legal services. Both the per-se illegal rule and the quick look test would trigger too
much unnecessary and strict antitrust scrutiny on those genuine settlement agreements.
Furthermore, the Actavis judgment aims to analyse the real purpose of a reverse 
payment rather than investigating the validity of the disputed patent. By excluding fair 
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consideration for saved litigation cost and service exchange in good faith, the 
unjustified reverse payments are read as a sign of confidence in the patent involved.
The unsolved problem is, in cases where value transfer from the originator is not 
straightforward cash payment but other benefits, to what extent may they be acceptable?
To what extent may those value transfers become anti-competitive? The following 
sections will try to answer the questions.
30
3 Classifying and analysis of pay-for-delay 
settlements
3.1 Necessity of differing and classifying pay-for-delay 
settlements
             Section 3 will further examine the anti-competitive effect of different types of 
pay-for-delay deals. First of all, this subsection will explain the necessity to classify 
pay-for-delay settlements, the several difficulties and considerations, and how the new 
method of assessing and classifying will serve the coming analysis.
It is obvious from the history of anti-competition scrutinises against pay-for-
delay settlements in EU and US that such deals have complex variations and not all of 
them may be anti-competitive. Over-enforcement of competition law in pay-for-delay 
cases may eventually lead to higher amount of weak or invalid patents. Both originators 
and generics fear potential patent litigation. If prospect of reaching a settlement 
agreement is unreasonably challenged by competition law and potential fines, firms may 
simply refrain from entering the market in question. A new invention may be possible in 
this situation, yet at the cost of extra research time and possible failure of small firms. A 
classification and assessment approach is necessary to focus competition law scrutinise 
on the most dangerous pay-for-delay deals avoid such over-implementation.
The phrase “pay-for-delay” indicates that the value transfer is for the purpose of 
delaying generic market entry. However the realistic value transfers in such cases may 
serve some other or several different purposes. The amount of the value transfer may 
also bring about different effects to the market. These differences could be hard to tell 
because parties may try to disguise the deal into a superficially fair and genuine 
settlement agreement. Apparently according to the EU Commission, lots of the side-deal 
agreements are artificial only for the purpose of providing a reason for monetary 
payment73. Proper classification of pay-for-delay deals by their superficial features that 
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reflect their level of potential anti-competition effect would make the investigations 
easier.
3.2 Consideration on classification of pay-for-delay 
The classification of the pay-for-delay deals must take it into consideration that 
the anti-competitive issues of such deals are overlapped with scope of patent law and 
settlements, which competition law should give due respect to.
Neither absolute distrust nor reliance on patent system helps to solve the issue. 
It is not competition authorities’ speciality to judge on the merit of an originator or a 
generic’s patent, which is normally even highly complicated for the experts at the patent 
offices. In pay-for-delay deals, because the parties settled without a court decision is 
made on the patent dispute, there’s no obvious proof showing that the originator’s patent 
is weak or invalid nor that the side deal is designed to disguise the weak patent. If 
competition authorities delegate the examination of patent validity to patent office for 
the purpose of competition law, it will add extra time and financial burdens to the drug 
manufacturers expecting to recoup their sum costs. It will also deprive the parties’ 
willingness to save litigation costs and exchange goods and services via settlements, 
causing extra transaction costs. However, as past cases prove, it is also improper to 
simply presume that a patent is valid before proven otherwise. Although the scope of 
patent forms the zone within which the right holder could exclude others from profiting 
from the patented invention, such monopoly is inherently restricted by law. Patent law 
not only need to ensure the economy recoup of inventors, but also a sufficiently 
abundant public domain for future inventions. It has been recognized that over 
protection of patents (through protection period or through protecting weak inventions) 
would burden the competitors with cost of asking for licensing or innovate around.74
Overly respecting a granted patent may thus also harm innovation. In pay-for-delay
situations, the merit of the patent is not proven before a court. And even when a patent 
itself is valid according to patent office, the use of it might still be anti-competitive
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according to previous cases. (for instance United states v. Singer Manufacturing Co.75)
Patents cannot be exempted from competition law scrutiny.
Also, private settlements could be very different from court litigations. In a 
court, a decision is made on who wins the case and gets compensation. Similar 
situations may happen where the originator holds an undoubtedly valid patent and 
surely infringed by the generic. No value transfer is needed from the originator in this 
case and the generic should simply compensate and discontinue the infringement. 
However, it has been noticed that IP settlements often result in other forms, such as a 
license agreement76, in which the licensor is acknowledged as the rightful proprietor of 
the patent. The licensor grants the licensee the right to produce and/or marketing. Good 
faith IP settlements as such are encouraged under various IP systems. Such value 
transfer facilitates launching of more products and will eventually stimulate dynamic 
competition. What competition law cares are those payments not genuinely for 
exchanging benefits but to induce competitors to delay market entry. However, due to 
the existence of large amount of good faith settlements, competition law cannot simply 
rule out and frustrate all the other good faith settlements.
The new classifications thus will focus on analyzing the characteristics of a pay-
for-delay deal rather than presuming the merit of the patent or that of the settlement. 
3.3 Introduction of new classification method
This section introduces Graph A as the starting point of the classification. Graph 
A is based on the two factors mentioned by the competition authorities. It sets value 
transfer as the horizontal axis and limitations on generic entry as the vertical axis. 
Agreements with existing value transfer as well as limitations are in the red and orange 
areas, representing B.II. agreements as defined by the Commission. Agreements with 
limitations yet zero/negative value transfer to the generics fall into the yellow area, 
representing B.I. agreements. The same logic applies to the third and fourth quadrant of 
Graph A.
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Graph A is designed to facilitate understanding of different variations of pay-
for-delay agreements. Agreements in each color block bear their own features and 
competition law concerns. 
The simplest case of a pay-for-delay agreement would be the red point in the 
Graph (“Max limitation and Value Transfer”), where the generic is banned from 
launching its own version of the reference drug and the value transfer reaches the 
maximum price that the originator would reasonably be willing to pay (the amount of 
total profits that the originator would have gained without the market entry of the 
generic). For the purpose of analysis in this thesis, such cases are defined as ‘Perfect 
pay-for-delay scenarios’. Such an extreme case could illustrate the anti-competitive 
element of a pay-for-delay deal. (See Section 3.4.1)
3.4 Anti-competition risks of variations of pay-for-delay 
settlements
3.4.1 An extreme case: perfect pay-for-delay
Section 2.4 noted that pay-for-delay deals of cartel nature are anti-competitive 
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by object. Cartel agreements involving market sharing enable competitors to remain 
their respective highest profit by refrain from natural competition, leading to higher 
prices and harm consumer benefits. 
A perfect pay-for-delay is such a case. Should the parties settle with genuine 
belief in the validity of the originator’s patent, there wouldn’t be a reason for huge 
amount of cash payment from the originator. Some sharing of litigation cost might 
occur, but only of a relatively small amount. The only logical reason of the payment is
that it is an inducement for the generic to drop the challenge and refrain from competing 
with the originator. The parties here reached an agreement on profit and market 
allocating/output limitation77, committing a cartel. 
However, as it is shown in Table A, in practice, companies would hardly reach 
such a settlement. It simply seems too obvious for the competition authorities and too 
fragile to defend from. The following subsections will demonstrate why Graph A is a 
useful device for analysing pay-for-delay cases and what are the possible anti-
competitive effects of other various kinds of pay-for-delay cases.
3.4.2 An Economic presumption on reverse payment – based 
on the amount of reverse payment
In the Orange and Red fields of Graph A, a pay-for-delay deal includes both 
restrictions on generic entry and reverse value transfer. As said, the key would be 
analysing the relationship between the two features; whether the generic’s decision of 
not entering the market was a willingness decision based on the merit of its patents and 
the risk of losing a patent litigation, or on the inducement from the reverse payment.
Economists have suggested that the range of an originator’s willingness to 
induce a potential generic competitor to stay out of the market is driven by the cost of 
losing its monopoly. We can imagine a situation where the originator is considering 
paying off a generic firm who challenged his patent. If M=total monopoly profit that an 
originator is expecting to gain based on the monopoly price prior to settlement; C= total 
profit gain if a generic succeed in challenging patent and entered the market; L = 
litigation cost; Pw=originator’s estimated probability of winning; PL=originator’s 
estimated probability of losing 
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Then the originator’s capacity to pay the generic to settle the case would be 
X = M - Pw x M+ PL x (C-L)78. 
The two key driving elements in this equation are the value of P (either for 
winning or losing the case) and the value of (M-C). The more an originator is confident 
in wining a patent dispute (high Pw), the smaller is the value of X, meaning the 
originator has less to offer to the generic. Similarly, the smaller the price difference 
between M and C, the less will the originator have to offer.
So if other conditions remain the same, if an originator is willing to pay off a 
generic with excessively large amount of money, it means either the confidence in 
winning litigation is low (need to take the risk-aversion attitude into consideration too) 
or that the monopoly profit gain is too high to lose. Or both are true. Therefore, large 
amounts of reverse payment shows an originator’s strong doubt on its disputed patent 
and motivation to form a cartel.
It is thus reasonable for the competition authorities to challenge a pay-for-delay 
deal with large reverse payments, which do raise a suspicion on one’s intention to pay a 
generic challenger. But since the equation is based on the presumption that an originator 
aims to pay off the generic firm, we should look into the possibility that the presumption 
is not true. The large payment could be for other purposes. This is where the horizontal 
axis in Graph A comes into play.
3.4.3 Red or Orange area: high-risk and medium-risk pay-for-
delay deals
3.4.3.1 Horizontal Axis
The horizontal axis will help the competition authorities to access the level of 
excessiveness of the payment and make a judgment on its association with the vertical 
axis (restrictions on generic entry). Five steps need to be taken to ensure a through 
examination.
Step 1. Understanding reasons for reverse payment
The first key question is what should the reverse payment be compared to. The 
author believes that the amount of the reverse payment should first be broken down into 
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the reasons behind the payments, the various services or agreements they claimed to be
paid for. 
Step 2.Examine the reasons for reverse payment
Secondly, a superficial examination on whether such services or agreements
themselves are anti-competitive should be carried out. For instance, payment for 
settlement cost saved is rather common and normal for settlement agreements. Parties 
may or may not share such costs the same way a court would order them to do. Also, as 
said, settlements are different from court judgments; some value transfer between the 
parties is common and acceptable for the purpose of settling uncertainties. When neither 
party is actually fully confident in their patents, mutual benefit is the best way to avoid 
court litigation and potential patent infringement. Such agreements with redeeming 
virtues79 may take the form of cash payments or some commercial agreements, the 
value of which could be a bit more than litigation cost. This should be recognized as the 
scope of settlement rather than anti-competitive by itself, their potential anti-
competitiveness should be examined in the following steps.
Step 3. Examine effect of reverse payment
One should then evaluate the value of the causes of the reverse payment to see 
whether they are excessive to what is needed for each cause. For cost of the settlement, 
it will be relatively easy to estimate based on the patent and the drugs involved in the 
dispute. For any commercial side agreements, if the value of the services to be provided 
by a generic according to the agreements is disproportionately lower than the payment 
made, then the suspicion of pay-for-delay inducing strengthens due to the excessive 
payment.
The hardest issue is how much freedom should be left to the parties in order to 
agree terms of a settlement? To what extent are the parties allowed to benefit each other 
in a settlement?     
In settlements certain restrictions and value transfers are an inherent result of the 
dispute resolution. For instance, non-challenge clauses in settlements impose 
restrictions on one party, but they are regarded necessary to resolve current disputes and 
avoid future disputes 80 . And license agreements, especially cross-licensing, are 
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recognized as legitimate and common approaches to resolve patent disputes81. Thus the 
coexistence of value transfer together with restriction on a patent challenger is possible 
to be totally natural and without anti-competitive object. But the fact that such 
arrangements are a natural result of settlements doesn’t protect them from competition 
law scrutiny. 
When the mutual/reverse benefits go beyond what is necessary to settle a 
dispute, such arrangements put unreasonable restraints on one party. For example, the 
new Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation Guidelines82 proposes that non-
challenge clauses may be caught by Article 101 when the patentee knows the patent was 
granted with incorrect or misleading information or the when there’s financial 
inducement from the patentee. The Commission and CJEU have also held in some 
intellectual dispute cases that agreements that simply aim for market partitioning or go 
beyond the necessity of avoiding confusion and would infringe article 81 (1) (Now 
article 101(1)) 83 . Similarly, in a technology transfer context, while the licensor is 
allowed to discontinue the license once a licensee challenge the patent84, such behavior 
could be subject to article 101 when the license is very valuable to the licensee. The 
right to discontinue differs from a contractual obligation or an inducement on the 
licensee to not challenge the validity of the patent.
So for the value transfers claimed to be within settlement scope (mostly, to 
avoid future uncertainty of the dispute, end current dispute, boost mutual benefits), they 
also need to be assessed on their power to impose obligation or inducement on the 
generics, and the actual restrictions imposed on the generic. It was even clear from the 
Commission’s Monitoring report that some reverse payment maybe too small to cause 
further investigation85.
As said in the beginning of the section, the more confident an originator feels 
about its patent, the less profit margin does it feel necessary to pay to the generic for no 
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reason. Originators could be requested to prove that the value transfers here would not
be large enough to act as a disincentive to the generics from launching their own generic 
drug if they could. Thus any reverse payment that is larger than the estimated profits of 
the generic would have a hard time escaping competition law scrutiny.
Step 4. Examine implementation of side-deals
Considering that the parties may forge side agreements where the generic offers 
services of high value, it is also meaningful to investigated how much of the services on 
paper are actually carried out. 
In J&J’s press release86, the Commission has mentioned that Sandoz actually 
carried out very little of the co-promotion activities according to their agreements, a
sign of the reverse payment outbalancing the value of serviced provided. If investigation 
shows that actual businesses has been carried out as considerations for the payment
during the term of the contract, the Commission could maintain supervision of the 
service provided to ensure that the agreement with the reverse payment is not a sham.  
Step 5. Examine value of side-deals
After passing the afore-mentioned steps, would the net profit of the service 
agreement be so big that it may be regarded as a cash inducement? Is that going to be 
anti-competitive as well? The author believes that it is much less likely so. As said, lots 
of the reverse payments are larger than the estimated profit gain of the generic firms, 
which caught the Commission’s attention. A well-performed good-faith contract, 
however, is much less likely to bring that amount of profit margin and serve the purpose 
of a inducement. Besides, the content of the service provided may bring certain pro-
competition effects. Investigation should balance between the pro- and anti-competition 
effect of the whole deal. Side deals that are fully carried out and with fair considerations 
do not need to be further scrutinized as the excessive ones.
Finally, a new issue has risen from the new post Actavis cases. When there’s no 
existence of side deals but only non-monetary value transfer from the originator, isn’t it 
possible that non-monetary benefit have exactly the same effect as naked reverse 
payment? The judgment cannot be so rushed since we are in the context of settlement. If 
the value of the non-monetary profits is minimal and the generic acknowledge the 
patent validity of the originator, the non-monetary benefit might just be a substitute for 
litigation cost. However, as concluded in Step 3, if the value of the non-monetary value 
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transfer is large enough to become a suspicious inducement for the generic to leave the 
market, the parties should bear the burden of proof to object to that suspicion.
Conclusion
After the examination of the 5 steps above, if a reverse payment turned out to be 
excessive, such a pay-for-delay should fall into the red-area of Graph A (“the high-risk 
pay-for-delay”). This type of pay-for-delay is most likely to have been designed by the 
generic and the originator to share monopoly profits, as the large amount of reverse 
payment is found groundless or hugely disproportionate to side agreements. And the 
size of the reverse payment implies the power of the originator to buy off a generic, and 
its power to keep monopoly price for consumers. 
If the reverse payment is not excessive, such pay-for-delay deals fall into the 
orange-area of Graph A, the medium-risk pay-for-delay, for which further investigation 
and analysis should be followed according to the next section.
3.4.3.2 Application of Vertical Axis
After an extensive examination on the value of the horizontal axis, now comes 
the vertical axis. What constitutes restriction in pay-for-delay deals has been introduced 
in section 2.4. The author suggests that all those mentioned forms of restriction, either 
explicit promise of market delay or non-challenge or other restrictions in agreements, 
should all be put above zero on the vertical axis. Restrictions imposed through 
agreements should be deemed less restrictive than non-challenges and explicit delay, as 
some of the restrictions may be inherent in commercial agreements and may bring about 
pro-competitive effects. 
Similar with value transfer, the higher value of restriction that is imposed, the 
more should it be scrutinized by competition authorities.
When reverse payment is excessive based on aforementioned examination, the 
level of restriction shouldn’t affect the initiation of competition law scrutiny. This is 
because, even if a clear restriction of market delay seems a much more dangerous sign 
than an acknowledgement of the originators patent, the latter could still be a false
claimant, where the parties aim to design a pay-for-delay deal into an undisputedly clear 
patent settlement. Therefore where reverse value transfer is deemed excessive, the level 
of restriction showed on agreements is not the primary element for pay-for-delay 
investigation. They do, supplement or illustrate the conclusions drawn from the 
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horizontal axis analysis.
For the medium-risk pay-for-delay deals, the reverse payment could be the 
natural result of a genuine patent settlement. Thus the level of restrictions on generic 
entry should be further reviewed in detail to ensure the restriction is necessary and 
proportionate for the purpose of settling patent dispute and future certainty. For 
instance, clauses that simply acknowledge an originator’s patent is probably the result 
of a genuine patent dispute. But to further restrict a generic in terms of its future product 
launching would be obviously beyond necessity. The generic is even restricted from 
launching non-infringing products in the future.
Extra restrictions outside the zone of intellectual property protection that do not 
have a real connection with the original IP dispute are also unlawful87. Such reasoning is 
also seen in the EU pay-for-delay cases. In the J&J case, the Commission stressed that 
the delay of generic entry and the co-operation agreement had nothing to do with any 
intellectual property matters88. Similarly, in Lundbeck, the Commission pointed out that 
besides the suspicious monetary value transfer, the restrictions on the generic firm were
also unreasonably beyond the scope of the patent. Lundbeck didn’t confirm whether the 
generic might enter the market without obstacles caused by Lundbeck. The anti-
competitive effect of such cases should be assessed case by case in relation to the 
market power of the parties.
3.4.3.3 Conclusion on High-risk and Medium-risk pay-for-delay
In conclusion, by conducting a 5-step assessment, this thesis defines high-risk 
pay-for-delay deals as those agreements with excessive and unjustifiable reverse 
payment. On the contrary, Medium-risk pay-for-delay deals are those of non-excessive 
reverse payment, but potential anti-competition effects.
High-risk pay-for-delay (Red)
Where the reverse value transfer is excessive and unjustifiable, it is more likely 
that the value transfer was an inducement to the generic for purpose of late market entry.
This is a sign of the parties’ arrangement of market and/or production allocation with
competitors, which is a cartel in nature. It is important that assessment on the
excessiveness of the reverse payment should not only focus on the amount. Detailed 
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examination should be conducted on the basis of the reverse payments, the amount and 
excessiveness of such payments, and the performance of the side agreements.
Medium-risk pay-for-delay (Orange)
For those pay-for-delay deals without excessive reverse value transfer, they are 
much less likely to be of a cartel nature. The restrictions imposed on the generic are
more likely to be necessary methods to exercise valid patent rights.
However, if the restriction is unnecessary and/or disproportionate for the 
purpose of settling patent dispute, medium-risk pay-for-delay deals may still have anti-
competitive effect. The same rules should apply to medium-risk pay-for-delay deals 
with restrictions that do not have connection to the dispute.
3.4.4 Yellow area: low-risk pay-for-delay deals
Settlements involving restrictions on generic entry but without reverse value 
transfer fall into the yellow area in Graph A (“low-risk pay-for-delay deals”). Although 
these cases are not by definition pay-for-delay case, they were under discussion in the 
Commission’s Monitor Report and may in very limited cases catch the attention of 
competition authorities.
Due to lack of reverse value transfer, pay-for-delay deals in this area are even 
less possible to become inducement cases compared to those in the orange area. The 
restrictions on the generic is most likely to be the result of a patent dispute where the 
generic indeed infringed the originator’s patent and ended up acknowledging that fact. It 
was observable from the Commission’s 4th Monitoring Report that in countries where 
pre-litigation settlements are requested by law, the number of settlement agreements of 
this kind is much higher than other member states.89
              Such settlement agreements may be anti-competitive in the cases where the 
restrictions on the generics are beyond the scope of patent. This could either be the 
situation that the patent was valid but the restriction is beyond the scope of protection
and the time period of the patent (See also Section 3.4.3.2), or that the originator knows 
or should know that the obtaining of the patent was a fraud due to misleading, incorrect 
or incomplete information during the application process (See also Section 3.4.4.1).
3.4.4.1 Blacklist: Sham litigation, Fraud in patent obtaining and naked 
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pay-for-delay
Previous sections introduced a proposal to assess the suspicious pay-for-delay 
deals. In some cases, however, the pay-for-delay may include certain elements that 
make them anti-competitive by nature.
One underlying principle from cases in both the US and the EU is that sham 
litigations or naked pay-for-delay cases are anti-competitive in themselves. So are 
restrictions on competitors in the context of a patent granted through fraud. In all of the 
three situations, there’s either no legitimate basis for restrictions on a competitor or the 
seemingly legitimate basis is forged or a fraud. And in lack of a solid reason to justify 
the restriction on competitors, the combination of reverse value transfer and delayed 
generic market entry become obvious sign of market allocation. 
The term sham litigation was frequently mentioned in US pay-for-delay cases 
and consistently regarded as anti-competitive90. In the US, sham litigation is generally 
defined as cases where the right being asserted is so weak that no reasonable litigant 
would have brought the action and where such baseless litigation is used to ‘conceal an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor’91. Thus the 
parties filed the action only to create a situation where the parties are invited to 
negotiate and settle. In the EU, sham licensing agreements aiming at concealing cartel 
behaviours are carved out from any safe harbours provided for by technology transfer 
agreement92. In the ITT Promedia93 case, the Commission established two requirements 
to establish the existence of potential sham litigation; first, the action could not 
reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish the rights of the undertaking 
concerned and thus can only serve to harass the opposite party. Secondly, the action is 
conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition. 
Meanwhile, as undertakings should not be demotivated from claiming for their rights to 
be heard in court, the key is not whether the rights of the undertaking concerned were
eventually found or not, but whether the undertaking could reasonably perceive such 
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rights at the time of initiating a litigation94. As long as a sham is proven, any other 
justification for the pay-for-delay behaviour would virtually become impossible. 
If an undertaking obtained a patent through fraud, by giving misleading, 
incomplete or incorrect information, the exclusionary power of a patent monopoly 
becomes unlawful. Any restriction on a competitor based on such fraudulent patent is 
unreasonable and anti-competitive. And for the originators that are dominant, provision 
of fraudulent information to patent offices for the purpose of excluding competitors 
constitutes abuse of dominance. A notorious example is the AstraZeneca case. 
Originator AstraZeneca was found providing misleading information to patent offices in 
several countries to prolong the exclusivity period for their patent (SPC). As the fraud 
was later interpreted in light of AstraZeneca’s other abusive behaviors, the Court 
concluded that the fraud aimed at delaying or preventing market entry95, a new way of 
abusing dominant position.
In some cases, the parties don’t even bother to fake a justification for the pay-
for-delay deals. In the US, such naked pay-for-delay cases have been consistently ruled 
as anti-competitive by object.96 In FTCv. Warner Chilcott97, the drug of the originator 
Warner Chilcott was not patented. The generic Barr Laboratories later obtained market 
entry but didn’t launch the generic drug. Instead, the parties reached a pay-for-delay 
agreement in 2004, in which Warner Chilcott paid Barr 1 million USD and made it their 
supplier. In return Barr agreed to delay market entry for five years. Without the 
exclusionary effect of valid patents and the potential safe harbour of scope of 
settlement, such pay-for-delay are no doubt intended to induce competitors into 
monopoly sharing of profits..
All the aforementioned three situations would put a pay-for-delay deal into anti-
competitive category. However, investigation of the sham litigation and fraud in patent 
application are relatively hard to proceed. It is in the public’s interest to encourage 
undertakings to claim their own rights even though they might fail. Technology firms 
who already bear the burden of providing patent application documents should not be 
punished for unintentional mistakes during the process.
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3.4.4.2 Burden-of-proof
The burden of proof sets the general rule of who carries the proving process, but 
the standard of proof decides the real burden put on a party. Regulation 1/200398
stipulates that the burden of proving an infringement of article 101 rests on the party or 
the authority alleging the infringement. And the burden of proving that the conditions of 
article 101(3) are fulfilled rests on the party claiming the benefit. However, the 
regulation does not elaborate the standard of proof that the Commission needs to 
present. Generally, the standard of proof should be ‘beyond reasonable doubt’99.
Following from previous classification of pay-for-delay, the burden put on 
parties should vary for each type of pay-for-delay deal. It is the logical conclusion that 
when the pay-for-delay deal is of a less potentially harmful type, the Commission 
should put forward more factual evidence to establish the infringement. 
This means it would be sufficient for the Commission to provide factual 
evidence to establish a prima facie blacklisted pay-for-delay or high-risk pay-for-delay. 
And it would be the undertaking’s task to offer factual evidence to deny such 
infringement. If the undertaking fails to put forward such evidence, it should generally
not benefit from article 101(3) TFEU.
For the medium-risk pay-for-delay deals, as such cases are less likely to be 
objectively anti-competitive, the Commission should offer more factual evidences and 
analysis to establish the anti-competitive effect beyond reasonable doubt. When an
undertaking wishes to benefit from article 101(3) TFEU, it should be sufficient to prove
the existence of pro-competitive factors. It would then be the Commission’s task to 
conduct market analysis on whether such pro-competitive effect outweighs the anti-
competitive effects. This however, does not mean the burden of proof on article 101(3) 
is shifted back to the Commission100.
Such an arrangement is based on the logic that the more obvious that a case is 
anti-competitive, the less is needed for the Commission to illustrate the infringement. 
On the other hand, when the Commission cannot establish a blacklisted or high-risk 
pay-for-delay, the threshold of evidence providing shall be raised. This is avoids putting 
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too much burden on the undertakings so that they would not fear reaching a genuine 
settlement agreement.
3.4.5 Other factors influencing assessment of pay-for-delay
3.4.5.1 The patent in dispute: substance or follow-on
As it is introduced in Section 1.1, most originators try to protect their product 
with patent clusters. The substance patent protecting the active substance of a drug is 
generally well examined and solid. The originators would, however, file follow-on 
patents on the formulation, the concentration in dosage, forms and other features of the 
product. As these patents are often harder for patent officers to examine due to lack of 
relevant published information, not all of these patents could stand undoubtedly valid 
when challenged by generics. And as these follow-on patents are closely linked to the 
production of a product, they generally have very narrow scope, making it easier for 
potential competitors to circumvent. 
Therefore the fact that the disputed patent is a follow-on patent does cast certain 
doubt on the validity on the disputed patent and the intention of the settlement. On the 
other hand, if the main substance patent on an originator’s drug is in dispute, it is more 
likely that the dispute was genuine and the restrictions imposed on generic firm were 
not totally unreasonable. However, this factor could not be a starting point of an 
investigation because the competition authorities are not competent to judge the merit of 
the patents in dispute. Secondly, this factor should not become an absolute defence for 
the generics because the exercise of the patent right may still be anti-competitive, 
especially for those follow-on patents. 
If a follow-on patent of an originator was indeed valid and a generic did infringe 
the patent, the parties are still possible to enter pay-for-delay agreements. Because the 
originator may fear that the infringing generic will have the resource and technology to 
invent around the narrow follow-on patent. Lundbeck stressed on its appeal that the 
generics has infringed the process patent and therefore the generics are not potential 
competitors. This defence, however, will not remove the potential anti-competitive 
effect when the pay-for-delay falls into blacklisted or high-risk category. The parties are 
potential competitors in this case since the originator feels the necessity and urge to 
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induce the generic to leave the market. If the pay-for-delay is of medium-risk and the 
originator claim that the follow-on patent was infringed, then the originator should only 
restrict the generic’s use of the infringed patent. If the restrictions went beyond the 
patent at issue, the court should continue examine the effect of anti-competitive effect.
It is also possible that an originator had strong confidence in its follow-on patent 
upon the initiation of the settlement. As the discovery carried on, such confidence 
decreased, which motivates the originator to considering entering pay-for-delay 
agreements. The generic may defend itself by claiming it did genuinely fear that it had 
infringed the patent and therefore entered the settlement. While this could be a valid 
defense, the court needs to look at other evidences. If the pay-for-delay is of high risk, it 
is doubtful why the generic as the infringing party accepts the offer without anti-
competitive objective. If the pay-for-delay is of medium risk, meaning the reverse 
payment is not excessive, and that the generic is able to prove its genuine belief in its 
patent infringement, then the pay-for-delay may not be caught by article 101 TFEU due 
to lack of mutual agreement. The originator may, however, be subject to article 102 
TFEU if it suffices requirement of dominant firm.
To sum up, the validity of a follow-on patent may become a valid defense. It 
should nevertheless be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
3.4.5.2 Possibility of earlier market entry
Those who riposte to the Commission’s strict stance towards pay-for-delay 
argue it is unknown in a pay-for-delay deal whether the generic entry could have been
reached earlier. Because it is unclear whether the generic in question has the 
technology resources to enter the market to become a potential competitor, even in the 
absence of the financial inducement. Besides this uncertainty, cash payment may be 
the only acceptable option for the parties to settle101. Therefore pay-for-delay should be 
allowed when the generic doesn’t show real ability to compete with the originator.
However, while it is true that competition law should not go too far into the 
scope of settlement, it doesn’t mean that settlement agreements could be totally 
exempted from competition law. Not even when the reverse payment settlement is only 
one option. 
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The fact that a generic may or may not become a competitor does indicate pay-
for-delay deals should not be judged as per-se illegal. But uncertainty of the patent 
dispute does not take the doubt of cartel behaviour away. Instead, the more an 
originator gives a generic challenger excessive value transfer, the more serious does
the originator take the generic as a potential competitor. Therefore, the uncertainty of 
the generic entry should not play too important a role in the analysis.
3.5 Proposals
The emergence of pay-for-delay behaviours is caused by mixed reasons, the 
regulatory framework supervising the pharmaceutical sector, the technology-intensive 
nature of the industry, certain flaws of the current EU patent system, etc.
The EU policy seems to mainly put the emphasis on using competition law to 
eliminate weak patents in the current system, correcting IP by competition law102. The 
aim of competition law however, should focus on preventing and altering the anti-
competitive effect of such deals instead of fixing all the problems caused in other areas,
such as the weak validity of a patent in itself. Because all firms should have the right to 
benefit from a granted patent103, even if they may or may not be perfectly confident 
about gaining the patent upon filing. If a patent was wrongfully granted without the 
applicant’s intentional fraud, the applicant shouldn't bear the fault of the patent office
nor for its future legitimate exercise of that patent. 
On the other hand, competition law should care about those firms knowing the 
patent was likely to be invalid and still exercise this right to exclude third parties (and 
sham litigation), or those committing fraud during application, or those who have made 
an excuse out of the patent right to pay off/restrict a competitor104. Competition law 
should act only in response to certain exercises of patent rights in suspicious situations. 
In unsuspicious situations, the battlefield of enhancing innovation and patent quality 
should be left for patent system, which protects the quality of patents through invalidity 
defence and declaratory judgment actions 105 . Otherwise, overly scrutinizing by 
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competition law authorities into patent rights may cause firms to lose trust in the patent 
system and patent dispute institutions. 
Thus the starting point of solving the anti-competitive effect is to set up a 
monitoring system as well as a transparent, well-reasoned investigation process, rather 
than simply “intensify competition scrutiny 106 ”. A monitoring system prior to 
competition scrutiny on settlement agreements between originators and generics should 
focus on the content and amount of the reverse value transfer (likely to be an excessive 
payment or not), the restriction imposed on the generic, and the status of the disputed 
patent (main substance patent or process patent). For the monitoring, parties could be 
requested to disclose certain relevant information after a settlement is reached. For the 
investigation and assessing process, any formalist approach may demotivate innovation 
or overlook anti-competitive behaviours. So an approach similar to the US “rule-of-
reason” is more proper.
The improvement on quality of patents should be solved by the patent system. 
First, consistency among patent offices in different member states is important for 
boosting pharmaceutical firms confidence in the patent dispute system. Many have 
called for a single Community patent and an ad-hoc litigation system. The EPO has also 
started to “raise the bar” for patent applicants. Secondly, the procedure of patent dispute 
resolution should be more convenient to parties to avoid parties turning into settlements. 
One of the reasons that parties turn to settlements is that a court injunction might take 
long time and requires certain level of proofs. 
The Executive Summary of the Sector Inquiry also mentioned a few other 
methods to ease the administration burden on originator firms so that they feel more 
secure about the profit gains from the launching of drugs. Such proposals included 
streamlining the marketing authorisation process and improving pricing and 
reimbursement provisions.
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3.6 Summary
Some practitioners pointed out that objective anti-competitive restrictions 
should be restrictive by their very nature, which is either a conclusion based on past 
experience or through thorough analysis107. Pay-for-delay is not such a case. 
The complex nature of these different situations decides that it is too strict and 
unreasonable to adopt a “per-se illegal”/”by object anti-competitive” views to all pay-
for-delay deals. The different levels of competition law scrutiny they should receive are 
as follows. Pay-for-delay deals with the blacklisted features are most anti-competitive. 
Pay-for-delay deals accompanied with sham litigation, fraud in patent or naked pay-for-
delay should be deemed anti-competitive by object. If no such blacklisted situations 
were found, a five-step examination would examine the excessiveness of the reverse 
payment and then divide high-risk pay-for-delay from medium-risk and low-risk ones. A 
pay-for-delay deal with excessive reverse payment means that the payment and the 
whole restriction to the generic had no legitimate ground to be “ancillary”108 to the 
settlement. Among the medium-risk and low-risk deals, the examination of the 
restrictions on the generic firms and their necessity would help one to judge whether 
there existed unreasonable constraints to a competitor. Market power and the scope of 
the agreements should be taken into consideration to decide the anti-competitive effect 
of such agreements. Such a division of the pay-for-delay deals help to pick out those 
ones which are obviously outside the scope of settlements and intended to share 
monopoly profit (high-risk) from those within the scope of settlements but could be 
potentially restrictive to competition (medium-risk). 
The author also objects to the Commission’s remarks on the function of 
competition law to eliminate weak patents. Even though it is a problem of the patent 
system, it is better for competition law to remain passive until reasonable doubt of anti-
competitive activities arises. 
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4 Conclusion
In conclusion, those “pay-for-delay” deals that are anticompetitive are surely 
influential to its relevant market and stakeholders and competition authorities should 
take necessary steps to punish such behaviour. However, the issue of “pay-for-delay” is 
in the very heart of a conflict between the patent system, competition law authorities 
and the public policy of settlements. To avoid negative impact brought by over-
implementing competition law, it is necessary to be aware of the nature and the scope of 
patent law and settlements.
The review of pay-for-delay cases in the US shows the modifications that US 
courts have strived for. The courts rejected the FTC’s per-se illegal rule and replaced 
with the “scope of patent” test, which overlooks the fact that such scope is not certain as 
the patent is in dispute. After a new “quick-look rule-of-reason” approach is introduced, 
which presumes a pay-for-delay to be anti-competitive with certain justification grounds, 
a split between the circuits arose. The landmark Actavis case symbolize the US Supreme 
Court’s realization that all the simplistic approaches brought up earlier are not sufficient 
for balancing the competition law concern and companies’ freedom to settle.
However, the Actavis judgement remains general, leaving it for the district court 
to conduct its own test. The author believes, as Europe has just started its competition 
law scrutiny into pay-for-delay, it is beneficial to learn from its US counterpart. This 
thesis agrees that a rule-of-reason approach would be appropriate and suggests a 
classification system based on the level of anti-competition risk of a pay-for-delay deal. 
The proposed classification system gives due respect to the scope of settlements and 
tries not to order the competition authority to intrude into the detailed contents of 
patents. Only the blacklisted and high-risk pay-for-delay deals should be able to be 
considered anti-competitive by object. Medium- and low-risk pay-for-delay could be 
subject to monitoring when necessary.
Finally, to offer a robust and innovative environment for the pharmaceutical 
industry requires not only competition law effort but also improvement of the 
consistency of patent system, the convenience of court process, and efficiency of 
national reimbursement systems to support the drug manufacturers.  
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